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Abstract
A great body of literature suggests that the poor were better off before the microfinance sector’s
paradigm shift of the mid-1990s. The sector’s ‘dependent’ constituents’ focus changed in an
effort to cope with the changes dictated by its ‘controlling’ constituents. This paper’s key finding
is that the not-for-profit sector, where beneficiaries’ interests are at stake, and the corporate
sector, where owners and management are separate, should undergo an externally dictated
change only after passing through a regulating agency’s scrupulous check, lest the change harm
the sector’s beneficiaries. The paper attempts to create awareness among policy-makers of the
need to be thoughtful of the ultimate beneficiaries in similar cases of externally dictated
organisational change.
Key words: Not-for-profit sector, organisational change, controlling and dependent
organisations, regulations
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Introduction
The primary purpose of microfinance is to provide loans of small amounts to poor people at an
affordable interest rate, to help them start a small business and get out of poverty. However, after
the paradigm shift of the 1990s in the finance sector, microfinance organisations have to strive
not only to accomplish their primary objective, but also to keep their other stakeholders happy
and content. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that an
organisation can ensure its success and long-term survival if all its policies and procedures
conform to the local social values, and the benefits to the local community of its overall
operations meet the community's expectations. This ensures that the organisation is sustainable
and legitimate in the eyes of the general public, and thus eligible for the community's scarce
resources. The following section will examine the welfarist approach to microfinance, which was
the predominant approach until the mid 1990s. The paper will then discuss the shift in paradigm
from the welfarist approach to the institutionist approach, and how this shift could ultimately
jeopardise the microfinance sector’s success in achieving its core objectives.
The commercialisation of the microfinance sector is a relatively new phenomenon, and
carries a negative connotation for some academics of exploiting the poor. However, many
professionals in the field advocate the concept, and refer to it as “the application of market-based
principles to microfinance” or “the expansion of profit-driven microfinance operations”
(Charitonenko & Afwan 2003, p. 2). These professionals argue that the limited outreach of
microfinance services around the world makes it necessary to introduce the sector to
commercialisation principles so that MFOs can meet the ever-expanding demand for
microfinance services on a sustainable basis (Charitonenko & Afwan 2003).
Charitonenko and Afwan (2003) described the completion of microfinance
commercialisation as a four-step process. First, the MFO changes its approach to its overall
administration and operation from not-for profit to for-profit. At this stage, the institution
diversifies its product-line, introducing new financial products according to the needs of its target
clients. Second, the institution strives for operational and financial self-sufficiency. This involves
keeping all costs at the lowest possible level, but without any negative impact on the level of its
outreach. Third, instead of looking around for subsidised financial resources, the institution tries
to generate market-based funds to meet its capital requirements. This may include seeking loans
from other mainstream commercial institutions, mobilising voluntary savings and resorting to
other non-subsidised sources. Fourth, the institution changes its overall approach and adopts
commercialism in all its policies and operations. In other words, it tries to work alongside other
mainstream commercial institutions and attract equity investment from commercial sources.
This, however, may make it subject to government regulations and supervision.
The paper is informed and the empirical data2 explained using a theoretical framework
from Laughlin’s (1991) model of organisational change. The data collected for the case study
shows that the Microfinance Division of the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP)
went, more or less, through the four steps listed above to reach full commercialisation. The
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This study is part of a larger study in which semi-structured interviews were conducted in Pakistan with the
members of the top- and middle-level management team at both the AKRSP and the FMFBL to collect empirical
data; in addition, print media (newspapers and magazines), annual reports, minutes of meetings of the board of
directors and archival documents, were consulted for secondary data. Full details of the empirical data are not given
in this paper for reasons of space.
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AKRSP3, however, had to transform into a completely different organisation to complete the
commercialisation process.
The Paradigm Shift
Traditionally, the long-term survival and sustainability of MFOs have been largely dependent on
the provision of subsidised financial resources from the international donor community. Their
Subsidy Dependence Index4 indicates their extremely high level of dependence on the
continuous inflow of subsidised funds (Yaron 1994). Thus, MFOs’ long-term survival and
sustainability has depended primarily on two factors: the provision of subsidised financial and
non-financial resources and the general public’s support (i.e., society’s endorsement).
Figure 1
Diagrammatic representation of MFOs’ sustainability arrangements before the changed environmental
conditions
Subsidised
Resources
from Donors
MFO’s Survival
and
Sustainability
Society’s
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Core
Objective
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the
poorest of
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The various types of subsidies to MFOs have included low-interest loans from the government or
donors, government absorption of foreign-exchange losses on loans denominated in foreign
currencies, reimbursement of operating costs by donors, exemption from reserve requirements or
forced investment in government securities, and obligatory deposits by other financial
institutions at below-market interest rates (Yaron 1994). Figure 1 shows the prerequisites of a
MFO’s long-term survival and sustainability.
The financial resources needed by the microfinance sector have been far beyond donors'
ability to provide without any provision for repayment. The most recent estimates put the market
demand for microfinance services at US$300 billion, while the supply was a meagre US$4
billion (Meehan 2005). Without withdrawing the helping hand altogether, the donor community
considered it essential for MFOs not only to cover their operational costs but also to earn profits
to sustain their operations. They wanted the sector to sustain itself by controlling costs and
ensuring profitability while still operating under the donors’ supervision and help – a system
3

The name ‘Aga Khan Rural Support Programme’ refers in this paper specifically to the Microfinance Division of
the AKRSP.
4
An MFO’s SDI shows the extent of its dependence on the availability of subsidised funding (Yaron 1994, p. 56).
87

AAFBJ | Volume 5, no. 4, 2011

often referred to as the financial-system approach. The idea was that MFOs’ profitability would
attract private investment, which was essential for enhancing the outreach of the microfinance
efforts. Donors now wanted to ensure that MFOs show operational and financial efficiency and
demonstrate efficient use of the funds already at their disposal before allowing them further
financial assistance (Rhyne & Otero,1994; Yaron, McDonald & Charistonenko 1998).
As discussed above, microfinance (often referred to as "microcredit" in the literature) was
originally used as a poverty-reduction tool by non-government organisations (NGOs), and
depended heavily on donors’ support in the form of subsidised financial resources (Armendáriz
& Morduch 2010; Yaron 1994). The performance of MFOs in achieving their primary objective
of eradicating poverty had been discouraging. Morduch (1998) argued that despite the
remarkable attention being paid to microfinance as a tool to eradicate world poverty, the real
achievements of microfinance were questionable. Cernea (1993, p.12) revealed that 13 out of 25
World Bank projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America had no long-term developmental impact
on their respective areas of operations, and had failed to benefit their respective communities.
In the early to mid-1990s, the donor community started changing their approach to the
sustainability of MFOs, from providing subsidised financial resources to emphasising MFOs'
profitability and self-sustainability (Hermes & Lensink, 2007; Robinson 2001, 2002). The idea
was that subsidies would be provided to cover start-up and expansion costs, and that MFOs'
long-term sustainability would be achieved through revenues from their operations (Schreiner
2002). The shift in the donor community’s thinking from a welfarist-based to an institutionist or
financial systems-based approach can be traced back to this period (Baydas, Graham &
Valenzuela 1997; CGAP 1996; Chaves & Gonzalez-Vega 1996; Dichter 1996; Fernando 2006;
Gonzalez-Vega & Schreiner 1997; Robinson 2001, 2002; Rogaly 1996; Yaron 1994). As a result
of this changed approach, the microfinance sector started to evolve, and the NGOs and other
MFOs started experiencing two external environmental disturbances: stresses to profitability and
to self-sustainability.
Profitability and Self-Sustainability Stressed
MFOs throughout the world now have to cope with the changing circumstances that have moved
the microfinance sector out of the heavily donor-dependent arena of subsidised funding into one
in which MFOs become part of the mainstream regulated financial system, and have to base their
operations on the principles of commercialisation.
The literature suggests that MFOs will not reach their optimal level of operational and
financial efficiency unless subsidised funding to the sector is withdrawn. To improve MFOs'
profitability, they should be made self-dependent for their capital requirements. To ensure the
maximum outreach to the world’s poor with a variety of financial services, the microfinance
sector now has to seek commercially available funds instead of looking for subsidised resources.
As Figure 2 shows, taking savings deposits from the general public and attracting private-sector
investment through high rates of return on investments are the two available options for MFOs to
meeting their capital needs (Hubka & Zaidi 2005; Morduch 1999).
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Figure 2
Diagrammatic representation of the MFOs’ sustainability arrangements after the changed environmental
conditions.
Emphasis on selfsustainability through
ensuring profitability
and controlling costs
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The ‘Welfarist’ Approach
The main objective under the welfarist approach is to reduce poverty through subsidised credit.
The idea is to ensure the continuous inflow of subsidised financial resources to the sector. In
addition, the intermediary organisations ─ in other words, the MFOs ─ must also ensure that
loan recipients receive appropriate training in the prudent use of scarce financial resources and
develop their skills in undertaking different business ventures. This approach also aims to create
a general awareness of health- and education-related issues among poor borrowers (Armendáriz
& Morduch 2010). Advocates of the welfarist approach argue that to alleviate poverty, all these
financial and non-financial services should be ensured through the availability of subsidised
resources (Ledgerwood 1999): unlike in the mainstream business sector, financial resources are
provided at an interest rate substantially below the prevailing rate in the open market. However,
as subsidised financial resources are limited, the number of poor households served also remains
limited. In addition, the survival and sustainability of MFOs remain dependent on the provision
of these resources on a continuing basis (Robinson 2001).
In opposition to 'institutionists', advocates of the ‘welfarist’ approach argue against
charging the market interest rate on loans to the poor. The literature shows that many poor
households who participate in microfinance programs cannot bear the burden of commercial
loans at the market interest rate. Thus, it is not possible to simultaneously accomplish two
contradicting objectives: first, ensuring profitability on the part of microfinance organisations
through charging an interest rate that could cover all operational costs and make a profit; and,
second, ensuring the eradication of poverty. The profit motive will overtake the service motive
if MFOs emphasise profitability more than outreach and poverty eradication (Woller, Dunford,
& Woodworth 1999). Also, as indicated earlier, MFOs’ struggle to survive and earn profits, and
their use of commercial tactics, translates into a reduced demand from the sector’s intended
beneficiaries – the poor (Armendáriz & Morduch 2010). This in turn means failure on the part of
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the sector, even though its constituents – the MFO’s, may eventually be able to sustain
themselves through generating profits.
Woller et al. (1999) argue that advocates of the ‘welfarist’ approach are not interested in
banking per se. They merely want donors to keep providing subsidised financial resources to the
sector. They argue that providing subsidised financial and non-financial resources to the
economically active poor is the only way for international development agencies to fight world
poverty, and that MFOs should not see the poor as a source of profit for their long-term survival
and sustainability. Some researchers argue that more emphasis on ‘cost recovery’ and
‘profitability’ on the part of MFOs in order to survive and achieve sustainability in the long run
would result in a deviation from the very purpose for which the program was initially developed:
poverty eradication, which is primarily a social objective (Khan 2008).
The ‘Institutionist’ Approach
The ‘institutionists’ have a different scenario to present. Robinson (2002) argues that the success
of MFOs – in both making a real dent on poverty through reaching a maximum number of poor
households and ensuring their own long-term survival and sustainability – depends on their
ability to adopt principles of commercialisation in all their operations. The approach finds its
roots in the Ohio school of thought on microcredit (Hulme & Mosley 1996). The institutionist
approach has proven to be a viable alternative to making financial services available to the poor
on a large scale, while also ensuring MFOs' profitability and self-sustainability (Robinson 2001,
p. 23).
Many of the subsidised microfinance programs have failed to improve the lives of poor
households, as well as failed to realise the full benefits of the donor community's allocating its
scarce resources to the sector (Fernando 2006; Rhyne & Otero 1994). Donors now want to make
sure that the benefits from the available resources reach the maximum number of poor
households. In addition, in order to encourage more inflow of financial resources, the sector has
to attract private capital, for which it needs to show a reasonably high return on investment, at
least more than the opportunity cost of private capital. This is possible only if MFOs switch to
commercialism and ensure a scrupulous check on their operational and administrative costs and
charge a market rate of interest on their loans.
However, MFOs’ commercialism should not be limited to charging higher interest rates
on loans only. It should also reflect in their overall operations and the variety of services they
offer to the poor (Christen & McDonald 1998; Rhyne & Otero 1994) Advocates of the
‘institutionist’ or ‘financial system’ approach argue that by showing profits to society, an MFO
can present itself as a legitimate recipient of the society’s limited financial resources. If the
organisation is able to pay back what it has borrowed from society, then it will be considered
worthwhile from a social service point of view, and be deemed to benefit the poor community at
no cost to the society.
Supporters of the ‘institutionist approach’ maintain that to achieve sustainability in the
long run, MFOs have to adopt a ‘financial system’ approach under which the main objective is to
achieve financial self-sufficiency (Hermes & Lensink 2007; Robinson 2001). The focus is on the
MFO, and institutional success is gauged by the extent to which the institution is financially selfsufficient and subsidy-free (Woller et al. 1999). The idea, under the institutionist approach, is to
pursue microfinance efforts through a large number of commercial institutions, with all their
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operations geared towards achieving profitability and long-term self-sustainability, instead of
expecting subsidies from the donor community (Schreiner, 2002; Woller et al., 1999). Robinson
(2001), an active advocate of the institutionist approach, argued that to diminish the wide gap
between the available financial and non-financial resources and the potential demand MFOs
would have to switch from a social service-oriented to a business-oriented approach.
Success of MFOs
The literature suggests there is no evidence of overall success of MFOs in eradicating poverty
using subsidised financial resources provided by the international donor community (Rhyne &
Otero 1994). Many MFOs, while trying to secure their position, impose a condition on poor
borrowers of providing some assets as collateral. This apparently excludes the main category of
poor households ─ those in the ‘extreme poor’ category, for whom the formal microfinance
effort was originally initiated – as they normally do not possess any assets acceptable as
collateral. In the case of Bangladesh, for instance, MFOs have been potentially excluding many
of the deserving poor households. The overall outreach of MFOs in the country in terms of
reaching those in the ‘extreme poor’ category can be ascertained from the fact that only about
25 per cent of all clients of MFOs can be classified as ‘extreme poor’ (Morduch 1999). Thus,
MFOs cannot claim success in terms of the achievement of their primary objective of eradicating
world poverty (Christen & McDonald 1998).
Braverman and Huppi (1991) and Morduch(1999) have also condemned MFOs for their
apparent failure to accomplish their original objective of helping the poorest of the poor. Zaman
(1999) studied the effects of the microfinance operations of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement
Committee (BRAC) ─ a prominent microcredit provider in Bangladesh – on the overall level of
poverty in the areas of its operations. He did praise the MFO’s contribution to poverty reduction
in the region, but claimed at the same time that its success was not unconditional. He concluded
that the positive impact of the program was conditional on two factors: first, the size of the loans,
as the increase in income of the poor recipients of the BRAC’s loans varied substantially from
borrower to borrower depending on the size of loan sanctioned to each borrower; and, second,
the level of poverty of the household at the time of receiving the loan. Similarly, Servon and
Bates (1998) argued that the performance of small businesses could be enhanced if a greater
amount of capital is invested to start with. They found a positive correlation between a small
business’s performance in terms of profitability and the amount of capital initially invested to
start the business.
The success of the microfinance effort can be looked at both from the MFOs’ perspective
and the borrowers’ perspective. The following section will discuss the perspective of MFOs.
MFOs’ Perspective
MFOs have to show profits to prove that their existence is not at the expense of their
stakeholders ─ the donor community, the MFOs’ staff and the society in general. To be
considered successful, therefore, MFOs have to serve the poor and, through effective costcontrol policies, provide an acceptable return on investment (Christen & McDonald 1998;
Megicks, Mishra, & Lean 2005; Rhyne & Otero 1994). This will enable them to gain the
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confidence of the poor as well as other stakeholders, which, in turn, will boost their chances of
attaining long-term sustainability and success (Megicks et al.2005; Schreiner,2002).
The introduction of commercialism to the sector places more stress on pursuing
sustainability through lowering organisational costs and raising interest rates (Christen &
McDonald 1998; Rhyne & Otero 1994). Rao (2003) asserts that:
the main objective of microcredit schemes is to provide sustainable microfinance with economic
development goals. If credit lending institutions can operate profitably and efficiently by targeting
lending priorities for the asset-poor in order to elevate the economic status of such borrowers (often to
remain above applicable poverty line) and without dependence on any significant financial subsidies,
then the microfinance scheme may be deemed to operate as a sustainable microfinance. (Rao 2003,
p.53)

The literature suggests that many MFOs do not fit into this new definition, which entails
serving the poorest of the poor in large numbers as well as showing profits from operations
(Morduch 1999; Short 2000). The poor expect to pay an interest rate that is normally insufficient
to cover all of the MFOs’ costs, keeping the MOFs financially dependent on the donor
community (Morduch 1999). Their financial products are not market-driven and do not meet the
specific requirements of the poor, which hampers their outreach (Megicks et al. 2005). The few
MFOs that have been judged as successful have achieved that status because they were almost
financially self-sufficient (Schreiner 2002).
The analysis of this situation reveals that there is a contradiction between the ultimate
objectives of these institutions and those of the poor. The struggle of MFOs to earn profits and
thus ensure their long-term survival proves to be in conflict with the objectives of the poor to
secure cheap financial assistance and help themselves to get out of poverty. Since these
organisations mostly provide services in remote rural areas and deal in very small amounts, their
transaction cost per borrower is normally very high. In order to cover their costs and provide a
steady return on their investments, these organisations must charge higher than the market
interest rate, thus shifting the costs to already-vulnerable poor households.
Borrowers’ Perspective
The success of MFOs can also be looked at from the borrowers’ perspective. The literature on
MFO performance suggests that their success in accomplishing their intertwined objectives of
poverty eradication and self-sustainability is not yet clear. Some researchers claim these
organisations have been successful in eradicating poverty (Khandker & Shahidur 1998;
Kloppenburg,2006); on the other hand there is also some research that concludes that they have
had minimal impact on poverty eradication (Morduch 1998).
While studying the poverty and famine issues in India and Africa, Dreze and Sen (1991)
concluded that the poor differed from country to country in dealing with their poverty issues.
They adopted different, complex strategies to fight poverty and manage their available financial
resources according to their particular circumstances. Dreze and Sen (1991) conceded that due to
this heterogeneous behaviour, borrowers are very unlikely to be brought out of poverty using a
single credit-dominated financial strategy. Rather, they need a variety of tailor-made financial
services to fit their specific circumstances (Dreze & Sen 1991).
Before the 1990s, microfinance was believed to be reaching the deserving poor. Since
then, however, evidence has not supported this belief. In the case of Bangladesh ─ the original
hub of formal microfinance, for instance – researchers concluded that many of the MFOs were
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not serving those in the ‘extreme poor’ category. A study by the BRAC’s Research and
Evaluation Division (RED) analysed the performance of its Rural Development Programs
(RDPs) and found that about 41 per cent of the most deserving poor were not covered by any of
the microfinance programs (Hasan 2003; Matin 2001). Few MFOs were incorporating
innovative approaches to strengthen their operations and cover the extreme poor under their
umbrella (Hasan 2003).
MFOs are left with two strategies to improve their performance: first, charge an interest
rate high enough to cover their operational and administrative costs, including bad loan losses,
and also provide a steady rate of return on their investments; and, second, take all possible steps
to keep their costs at a minimum (Conning 1999).
Close monitoring of their loan portfolios can complement MFOs' struggle for long-term
sustainability. As loans in the case of mainstream financial institutions are sufficiently covered
by collateral, the level of security against defaults is much higher when compared to institutions
in the microfinance sector. The concept of group lending, which is based on the element of joint
liability of all group members, covers MFOs against such risks by reducing or eliminating
possible losses from bad loans. In such types of lending the social relationships among members
of the group serve as collateral to secure the loan (Ghatak & Guinnane 1999).
The Case of the AKRSP
The AKRSP5 has been in operation in the northern part of Pakistan since its inception in 1982. It
has been actively involved in providing microfinance services in the area through its
Microfinance Division. The AKRSP offers an important opportunity for study, as it is a pioneer
in the field of microfinance in Pakistan (Gloekler & Seeley; Hussein & Plateau 2003); moreover,
after experiencing the external environmental ‘disturbances’ during the 1990s, as discussed
above, the AKRSP’s Microfinance Division successfully adapted itself to the new environmental
conditions (Hussein & Plateau 2003).
The Microfinance Division of the AKRSP, in response to the requirements of the donor
community to provide for its own long-term sustainability, had to ultimately transform itself into
an entirely new commercial setup ─ the First Microfinance Bank6 (FMFBL). The president of
the First Microfinance Bank Limited said donors did not want MFOs to remain donor-dependent
for the life of the institution, but wanted them to be self-reliant in the long run, and look for other
sources of funds, such as mobilising savings, to finance their operations.
The AKRSP’s credit programme, which started in 1983, was confined to short-term
loans, used mainly for agricultural inputs. Later, four additional loan products were introduced:
medium-term loans, the Village/Women’s Organisations Credit Programme (V/WOCP), the
Enterprise Credit Programme (ECP) and the Corporate Village Organisation Credit (CVOC).
These products remained on the ‘active products’ list until the end of 1998 (Table 1). In early
1999, during the AKRSP’s reorientation phase, these credit products were consolidated. The
collateralised credit products (short- and medium-term loans and the V/WOCP) were merged and
called group loans, while the Enterprise Credit Programme (ECP) became individual loans. The

5

The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP) was established in 1982 in the northern region of Pakistan
with the primary objective of eradicating regional poverty.
6
The author has conglomerated some of the primary data through interviews with officials at the AKRSP and the
FMFBL.
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CVOC product was closed altogether along with short- and medium-term loans (AKRSP’s
Internal Policies and Procedures 2000).
Table 1
Savings and Loan Products at the AKRSP, 1982-2001.
Loan Product
Short-Term Loans
Medium-Term Loans
Group Loans to VOs
Enterprise Credit Loans (ECL)
Corporate Credit Loans

Year of
Launch
1983

Year of
Withdrawal7
1999

9%

1984

1999

8%

Interest Rate

1989

15%

1992

16%, raised to 24% in 19988

19969

199910

2000
Business Committee Loans
Source: Adapted from Hussein and Plateau, 2003.

Varying Market Rate
Varying Market Rate

The AKRSP, after its initial adaptation to its ‘changed environment’, ultimately
transformed into a new, independent commercial setup: the FMFBL. The new position of the
AKRSP’s ‘interpretative schemes’, ‘design archetypes’ and ‘sub-systems’ (Laughlin 1991)
showed that an entirely new organisational setup had been born.
Commercialisation and Accountability
Advocates of non-commercialism in the microfinance sector argue that pressuring MFOs to
control costs and move to self-sustainability may result in their drifting from their primary
objective of eradicating poverty (Khan 2008). The empirical data collected for the study reveals
low outreach after the AKRSP's Microfinance Division transformed became the First
Microfinance Bank Limited (FMFBL). For instance, participant no. 10, a regional manager at
the Rural Support Programme Network, said that since the change, every branch was now trying
to be profitable because their performance was judged by their contribution to the profitability of
the bank and by how they met targets for cost control (including staff costs) and profitability.
Since the work is now done by a limited number of staff and cost control and profitability are the
foremost priorities, it is not possible to achieve that level of outreach that had previously been
possible. The participant also said that:

7

The management’s push to disburse an increasing number of loans during 1997 and 1998 resulted in high levels of
loan delinquency by 1999, necessitating withdrawal of some non-performing loan products.
8
During the AKRSP’s reorientation phase, interest rates on some loans were raised to cover operational costs and
provide for financial sustainability.
9
Corporate loans were introduced after the change initiated at the AKRSP in the quest for improving profitability
and ensuring self-sustainability.
10
This loan product was withdrawn due to its large size, high level of loan delinquency and staff’s inadequate
appraising expertise.
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…although the bank is gaining strength and sound financial footing, so what? From the poor people’s
point of view ‘to hell with it’. There is no shortage of good commercial banks in the country; the poor
want the services that are specifically for them, like the AKRSP was providing.

Participant no. 13, the president of the First Microfinance Bank Limited, commented that
the bank's objectives had become totally different, and that the real mission – poverty alleviation
– had been sacrificed, because in commercial microfinance, the MFO didn’t normally lend to
the poorest of the poor because of the high costs involved. He further added that:
…we believe that microfinance should not be purely on commercial terms and it should not deviate
from its main objective of poverty alleviation. Microfinance should fulfill the needs of the poor people
as well as those of the institution.

The AKRSP’s management openly expressed its concerns and raised several questions at
the Board of Directors meeting prior to the AKRSP’s transformation into a commercial bank:
“…how will the [FMBL] ensure the continuity of this mission given that it would be a national
level bank? The bank is a commercial institution, so how will it maintain a commitment to poor
people? If the bank’s objectives come in conflict with each other, how would such a conflict be
resolved? For example, would unprofitable branches in the NAs/C (Northern Areas and Chitral)
be closed down?” (AKRSP’s BOD Meeting,26th May, 2001).
The board members also expressed their concerns about the future of the AKRSP itself. It
was resolved in the meeting that the AKRSP should not end up in a situation where it would
have to start up a new microfinance programme because the bank could not serve the Northern
Areas and Chitral (NAC).
Theoretical Underpinnings
Under normal circumstances, organisations have to respond positively to external pressures and
adapt to cope with the dictated conditions to ensure their survival. This pressure is referred to in
the literature as institutional isomorphism. Meyer and Rowan (1977) defined institutional
isomorphism as:
the process by which organisations are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by
prevailing rationalized concepts of organisational work and institutionalized in society. (Meyer and
Rowan 1977, p.340)

Institutional isomorphism occurs when organisations are driven to follow institutional
norms and values set by leading players in the same industry to ensure their long-term survival
and sustainability. Organisations that directly or indirectly depend on other independent entities
for financial and/or non-financial resources must respond positively to the external
environmental disturbances (Laughlin 1991) created by these independent entities' changes in
policies to survive in the long run. The case of the AKRSP is no different in this regard.
Laughlin (1991) argues that an organisation’s ‘interpretative schemes’ are of utmost significance
in keeping an organisation’s elements intact and bound together. External pressure for an internal
organisational change can disturb an organisation’s basic coherence, that is, its ‘interpretative
schemes’. This leads to a new organisational ethos in the form of new set of ‘interpretative
schemes’, which is incompatible with the organisation’s existing ‘design archetypes’ and ‘subsystems’. This, in turn, necessitates changes in the organisation’s ‘design archetypes’ and ‘subsystems’. The extent of these changes depends on the extent of change in the 'interpretative
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schemes'. The new position of the AKRSP’s ‘interpretative schemes11’ after its transformation to
the FMFBL was entirely different, necessitating a widespread change in the remaining two
organisational elements. In other words, to cope with the external changed circumstances, the
MFI had to surrender its original identity in the face of the ‘unchecked’ externally dictated
conditions.
Conclusions
The literature suggests that demand for microfinance services will go down if interest rates
charged by MFOs goes up; indeed, this t has happened since the shift in donors’ approach to the
sustainability of the sector (Dean & Jonathan 2008). The paradigm shift from a welfarist
approach to an institutionist approach in the microfinance sector has largely gone unchecked.
This paper argues, in light of the above discussion and an examination of the case study of the
AKRSP, that the claimed 'success' of MFOs after the paradigm shift will remain under scrutiny
if commercialist principles are enforced and their survival and sustainability are made dependent
on their capacity to generate profits. Instead, this paper contends, they ought to meet the needs of
the ‘target poor’ they are designed and formulated for to be regarded as successful.
While the new commercially driven organisational setup claims to be successful and
boasts to be a high achiever, the real success of the MFO in terms of achieving its original
objectives of reaching the poorest of the poor will continue to be questioned by academics and
scholars. The question remains to be answered: are the poor better off now or before the change
in the donors’ approach? The above discussion logically suggests the poor were better off before
the change, and the MFOs and donor community after12. The authors recommends further studies
to quantitatively measure the performance of the AKRSP, with the main objective being to
ascertain its success, in terms of outreach and impact on poverty, before and after its
transformation to a purely commercial setup.
The evidence so far suggests that if a dependent organisation/sector is left helpless in the
face of externally dictated pressure for change, an outcome favourable to both the sector and its
constituents might not be possible; thus, the process may need the intervention of an independent
regulating agency.
References
Armendáriz, B & Morduch J 2010, The Economics of Microfinance, 2nd edn, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, London.
Baydas, M. Graham, D & Valenzuela L 1997, ‘Commercial banks in microfinance: New actors in
the microfinance world’, Microenterprise Best Practices Project, USAID. Development
Alternatives, Inc, Bethesda, Maryland.

11

The empirical data suggests changes in all three organisational elements of the AKRSP. Trochim’s (1989)
‘Pattern-Matching’ and Yin’s ‘explanation-building’ (1994, p. 110) models were used to establish themes and
extract trends from the data.
12
The author intends to undertake an empirical study on the quantitative analysis of the real benefits of the
AKRSP’s transformation to a commercial bank in terms of the program’s outreach and impact before and after the
change.
96

Khan: Dictating Change

Braverman, A. & Huppi M 1991, ‘Improving rural finance in developing countries’, Finance and
Development, vol.21, pp42-44.
Cernea, M 1993, ‘The sociologist’s approach to sustainable development’, Finance and
Development, vol.30, pp11-13.
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 1996, ‘Microcredit Interest Rates’, Donor Brief No. 1,
February, The World Bank: Washington, D.C.
Charitonenko, S & Afwan, I 2003, Commercialization of Microfinance: Indonesia, Asian
Development Bank, Manila.
Chaves, R A & Gonzales-Vega, C 1996, ‘The design of unsuccessful rural financial
intermediaries: Evidence from Indonesia’, World Development, vol.24, no.1, pp65-78.
Christen, R P & McDonald J 1998, The Microfinance Bulletin, Vol. II, The Economics Institute,
Boulder.
Conning, J 1999, ‘Outreach, sustainability and leverage in monitored and peer-monitored
lending’, Journal of Development Economics, vol.60, pp51-77.
Dean, K S & Jonathan Z 2008, ‘Credit elasticities in less-developed economies: Implications
for microfinance’, The American Economic Review’, vol.98, no.3, pp1040-1068.
Dichter, T W 1996, ‘Questioning the future of NGOs in microfinance’, Journal of International
Development, vol.8, no.2, pp259-269.
DiMaggio, P J & Powell, W W 1983, ‘The Iron Cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and
collective rationality in organisational fields’, American Sociological Review, vol.48,
pp147-160.
Dreze, J & Sen, A 1991, Hunger and Public Action, Oxford University Press,Oxford, UK.
Fernando, J L 2006, ‘Microcredit and empowerment of women: Blurring the boundary between
development and Capitalism’, in J L Fernando (ed.), Microfinance: Perils and Prospects,
Routledge, New York, pp1-42.
Ghatak, M & Guinnane, T 1999, ‘The economics of lending with joint liability: Theory and
practice’, Journal of Development Economics, vol.60, pp195-228.
Gloekler, A & Seeley, J 2003, ‘Gender and AKRSP ─ Mainstreamed or sidelined?’, Lessons in
Development ─ The AKRSP Experience. Aga Khan Rural Support Program.
Gonzalez-Vega, C 1994, ‘Stages in evolution of thought on rural finance: A vision from The
Ohio State University’, Occasional Paper No. 2134, Rural Finance Program, Ohio State
University, Ohio State University Press, Ohio.
Gonzalez-Vega, C & Schreiner, M. 1997, ‘The challenge of growth for microfinance
organisations: the case of Banco Solidario in Bolivia’, in H. Schneider (ed.),
Microfinance for the Poor? Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Washington D.C.
Hasan, M 2003, ‘Implication of financial innovation for the poorest of the poor in the rural area:
Experience from Northern Bangladesh’, Journal of Microfinance, vol.5, no.2, pp56-78.
Hermes N & Lensink, R 2007, ‘The empirics of microfinance: What do we know?’, The
Economic Journal, vol.117, no.517, ppF1-F10.
97

AAFBJ | Volume 5, no. 4, 2011

Hubka, A & Zaidi, R 2005, Impact of Government Regulation on Microfinance, accessed
24/5/2009,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/Hubka_Zaidi_Impact_of_G
overnment_Regulation.pdf
Hulme, D & Mosley, P 1996, Finance Against Poverty, Vol. I. Routledge, London.
Hussein, M & Plateau, S 2003, Lessons in Development ─ The AKRSP Experience:
Microfinance, Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Khan, A A 2008, ‘Commercialization of Microfinance ─ Is the Sector Losing its Identity by
Evading its Original ‘Social Service’ Responsibility?’, Social and Environmental
Accountability Journal, Vol. 28 No. 2, pp. 78-90.
Khandker, S R 1996, ‘Grameen Bank: Impact, costs, and program sustainability’, Asian
Development Review, vol.14, no.1, pp97-130.
Khandker, S R. & Shahidur, R 1998, Fighting Poverty With Microcredit ─ Experience in
Bangladesh, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Kloppenburg , N 2006, ‘Microfinance Investment Funds: Where Wealth Creation Meets Poverty
Reduction’, in I. Matthaus-Maier &J. D. Von Pischke (eds) Microfinance Investment
Funds: Leveraging Private Capital for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction, ,
Springer, Berlin, pp11-46.
Laughlin, R 1991, ‘Environmental disturbances and organisational transitions and
transformations: Some alternative models’, Organisation Studies, vol.12, no.2, pp209232.
Ledgerwood, J 1999, Microfinance Handbook: An Institutional and Financial Perspective, The
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Matin, I 2001, ‘Targeted development program for the extreme poor: Experiences from BRAC’s
experiments’, Chronic Poverty and Development Policy Working Paper No. 2, Institute
of Development Policy and Management, The University of Manchester, UK.
Meehan, J 2005, ‘Tapping the financial markets for microfinance’, Working Paper Series,
Grameen Foundation USA, Washington D.C.
Megicks, P. Mishra A & Lean J 2005, ‘Enhancing microfinance outreach through market-oriented
new service development in Indian regional rural banks’, International Journal of Bank
Marketing, vol.23, no.1, pp107-125.
Meyer, J W & Rowan, B 1977, ‘Institutionalized organisations: Formal structure as myth and
ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, vol.1, pp340-363.
Morduch, J 1998, The Microfinance Schism, Harvard University Press, Harvard University,
Mimeograph.
Morduch, J 1999, ‘The microfinance promise’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.37, pp15691614.
Rao, P K 2003, Development Finance, Springer, Berlin.
Rhyne, E & Otero, M. 1994, ‘Financial services for microenterprises: Principles and
institutions’, World Development, vol.20, no.11, pp1561-1571.
98

Khan: Dictating Change

Robinson, M S 2001, The Microfinance Revolution: Sustainable Finance for the Poor, The
World Bank, Washington, DC.
Robinson, M S 2002, The Microfinance Revolution: Lessons from Indonesia, The World Bank,
Washington, DC.
Rogaly, B 1996, ‘Micro-finance evangelism, ‘destitute women’, and the hard selling of a new
anti-poverty formula’, Development in Practice, vol.6, no. 2, pp100-112.
Schreiner, M 2002 ‘Aspects of outreach: A framework for discussion of the social benefits of
microfinance’, Journal of International Development, vol.14, pp591-603.
Servon, L J & Bates T 1998 ‘Microenterprise as an exit route from poverty: Recommendations
for programs and policy makers’, Journal of Urban Affairs, vol.20, no.4, pp419-442.
Short, C 2000, ‘Foreword’, in S. Rutherford (ed), The Poor and Their Money, Oxford University
Press, Delhi.
The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme 2000 Policies and Procedures Manual, The AKRSP
Core Office, Gilgit, Pakistan.
The Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, Minutes of the various Board of Directors Meetings,
The AKRSP Core Office, Gilgit, Pakistan.
Trochim, W M K 1989, ‘Outcome pattern matching and program theory’, Evaluation and
Program Planning, vol.12, pp355-366.
Woller, G M. Dunford C & Woodworth W 1999, ‘Where to microfinance?’, International Journal
of Economic Development, vol.1, no.1, pp29-64.
Yaron, J 1994, ‘What makes rural finance institutions successful?’, The World Bank Research
Observer, vol. 9, no.1, pp49-70.
Yaron, J. McDonald B & Charistonenko S 1998, ‘Promoting Efficient Rural Financial
Intermediation’, The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 13, pp147-170.
Yin, R K 1994, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd edn., Sage Publications,
Thousand Oaks, California.
Zaman, H 1999 ‘To What Extent Do Microcredit Program Reduce Poverty and Vulnerability in
Bangladesh?, World Development Report, The World Bank, Mimeo.

99

AAFBJ | Volume 5, no. 4, 2011

100

